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BOOK REVIEW
THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST. Edited by Herbert j. Storing. Chi-
cago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press. 1981. Seven vols. $175.00
(cloth).
ANTIFEDERALISTS: THE LOYAL OPPOSITION AND THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION
As George C. Scott so eloquently told us in his cinematic portrayal
of General George Patton, Americans like winners. Indeed, both popu-
lar and scholarly approaches to history often have little to say about
losers. How scholars have viewed the ratification of the Constitution
reflects this. The classic work supporting the Constitution-The Federal-
ist Papers-has been available in book form since 1788. Today paper-
back editions of it abound. Similarly, biographies and papers of such
famous federalists as George Washington, James Madison, John Jay,
and Alexander Hamilton are readily available. Even such lesser sup-
porters of the Constitution as John Marshall, Robert Morris, John Dick-
inson, and James Wilson are well-known historical figures.
Those who opposed the Constitution have not fared as well. Few
people have heard of Elbridge Gerry, Luther Martin, and Melancton
Smith. The three leading Virginia antifederalists, George Mason, Rich-
ard Henry Lee, and Patrick Henry, are better known, but probably not
for their opposition to the Constitution. Some leading antifederalists
have their biographers' and the personal papers of some have been pub-
lished. For the most part, however, legal scholars have directed rela-
tively little attention to the opponents of the Constitution. 2 More
importantly, the ideas these men had, and the arguments they ad-
vanced, have been neglected. .Dismissed as "men of little faith,"'3 the
1 Antifederalist George Mason even has a law school named for him.
2 The number of books and articles on antifederalists and antifederalism is quite small.
Among the leading works are: S. BOYD, THE POLITICS OF OPPOSITION: ANTIFEDERALISTS
AND THE ACCEPTANCE OF THE CONSTITUTION (1979); J.T. MAIN, THE ANTIFEDERALISTS:
CRITICS OF THE CONSTITUTION 1781-1788 (1961); R. RUTLAND, THE ORDEAL OF THE CON-
STITUTION: THE ANTIFEDERALISTS AND THE RATIFICATION STRUGGLE OF 1787-1788
(1966); Kenyon, Men of Little Faith.- The Antifederalists on the Nature of Representative Government,
12 WM. & MARY Q. 3 (3d ser. 1955). Background reading on the adoption of the Constitu-
tion should begin with C. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION
OF THE UNITED STATES (1913); G. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC,
1776-1787 (1969). William W. Crosskey is the most prominent legal scholar to give attention
to the ideas and politics of the antifederalists. See W.W. CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CON-
STITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES (1953 (vols. 1 & 2), 1980 (vol. 3 with W.
JEFFREY)).
3 See Kenyon, supra note 2.
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words of the antifederalists have, until now, been all but forgotten.4
To a large extent the late Herbert Storing's seven volume collec-
tion, The Complete Anti-Federalist, has remedied the lack of antifederalist
sources. Storing has assembled most of the important antifederalist doc-
uments, including some that have not previously been in print. An elab-
orate, yet easily used, footnote and index system supplements Storing's
first-rate editing job. Although there are many omissions in this collec-
tion,5 Storing has set the stage for a reinvigorated study of the Constitu-
tion by providing scholars access to the arguments of the document's
critics.
As the bicentennial of the Constitution approaches, it is worth ex-
amining the ratification debates. Such an examination requires a close
look at opponents of the Constitution as well as the document's support-
ers. Reading through The Complete Anti-Federalist teaches us the impor-
tance of the antifederalists in shaping the American Constitution. The
recurrent theme of the antifederalists is fear: fear that the national gov-
ernment would usurp the rights of the people; fear that without a Bill of
Rights all liberty would be destroyed; fear that the presidency and Sen-
ate would lead to an aristocracy. If these fears seem paranoid and out-
rageous today, it may be because the antifederalists expressed such fears
in 1787-88, and thereby helped define the nature of the American Con-
stitution. Through Storing's volumes we see that, for our constitutional
history, the arguments of the losers are just as important as those of the
winners.
I
THE INCOMPLETE ANTIFEDERALIST
At the outset it should be noted that The Complete Anti-Federalist is
not really complete. Some relatively well-known antifederalist docu-
ments are missing. The collection itself is geographically skewed. Stor-
ing has not included any articles from North Carolina, New Jersey, and
Delaware, only one article from Georgia, Connecticut, and Rhode Is-
land, and only two articles from South Carolina and New Hampshire.
The mere listing of these omissions resembles an antifederalist argu-
ment: Storing, like the Framers, has ignored the smaller states and the
deep South.
The failure to include any materials from North Carolina and the
4 For earlier reprints of primary materials on the antifederalists, see THE ANTIFEDER-
ALIST PAPERS (M. Borden ed. 1964); A. MASON, THE STATES RIGHTS DEBATE: ANTIFEDER-
ALISM AND THE CONSTITUTION (1964); THE ANTIFEDERALISTS (C. Kenyon ed. 1966);
ESSAYS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (P. Ford ed. 1892); PAMPHLETS ON
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (P. Ford. ed. 1888). Some individual antifeder-
alist pieces have been separately reprinted. Ste, e.g., LETTERS FROM THE FEDERAL FARMER
TO THE REPUBLICAN (W. Bennett ed. 1978).
5 See inra notes 6-17 and accompanying text.
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inclusion of only one antifederalist piece from Rhode Island is particu-
larly striking, in light of the fact that North Carolina and Rhode Island
were the last two states to ratify the Constitution. In August 1788, the
North Carolina Convention refused to ratify the Constitution by a
greater than two to one majority.6 North Carolina did not ratify until
November 1789.7 Rhode Island initially defeated the Constitution by
overwhelming votes in town meetings.
Ratification by a Rhode Island state convention did not occur un-
til May 1790, and then by the narrow vote of thirty-four to thirty-two.8
Thus, where antifederalist sentiment was strongest, Storing's collection
is weakest. In his introduction, Storing concludes that the "Anti-Feder-
alists lost the debate over the Constitution not merely because they were
less clever arguers or less skillful politicians but because they had the
weaker argument."9 Storing makes this assertion, however, without
presenting the arguments of the most successful antifederalist
politicians. 0
The absence of materials from North Carolina underscores the pau-
city of materials from the state ratifying conventions in Storing's collec-
tion. Even if Storing could not find newspaper articles or pamphlets
opposing ratification in North Carolina,"' he certainly could have
presented the speeches delivered in the state ratifying convention by
such antifederalist leaders as Willie Jones and Judge Samuel Spencer.12
Although eleven states had already ratified, and thus the new Constitu-
tion was in effect, the antifederalists at the 1788 North Carolina conven-
tion were still able to prevent their state from ratifying the document.
6 The vote is recorded in 4 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON
THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 250-51 (J. Elliot rev. ed. 1881) [hereinafter
cited as THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS].
7 R. RUTLAND, supra note 2, at 302-03.
8 Id at 303-04.
9 1 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 71 (H. Storing ed. 1981).
10 Storing fails to consider the possibility that the antifederalists were defeated for polit-
ical reasons. The political reasons would include: (1) the federalists were better political
organizers; (2) the federalists received the backing and financial support of the wealthier
classes in America in the campaign for ratification; (3) the elective franchise was limited in
ways that favored the federalists and hindered the antifederalists; (4) southern slaveholders,
who were for the most part federalists, wielded excessive political power because state appor-
tionment systems counted slaves even though slaves could not vote; (5) federalist supporters
included most of the famous and prominent men in the states who were more likely to be
elected to the ratifying conventions; (6) the ratification process made it possible for federalists
to ratify the constitution swiftly in the most pro-federalist states and thus undercut antifeder-
alist activities in other states; and (7) it was easier to organize urban constituencies, a majority
of which were federalist (and to ensure that their delegates attended the ratifying conven-
tions) than it was for the antifederalists to organize rural opposition. See, e.g., J.T. MAIN, supra
note 2, at 21-40 (discussing sectional and class alignments in the South).
11 There is no indication whether Storing searched for any such materials.
12 The debates of the North Carolina ratifying convention are reprinted in 4 THE DE-
BATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS, supra note 6, at 1-252.
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Surely their arguments are worth hearing and should not have been
omitted.
With only a few exceptions, Storing ignored the debates in the state
ratifying conventions. Although many of these debates are generally
available in Jonathan Elliot's five volume collection, 13 that is certainly
no reason for excluding the major antifederalist speeches from this set. 14
Although comprehensive, Elliot's volumes place the burden on the stu-
dent and scholar to identify the speeches of those who voted against
ratification. The Complete Anti-federalist would be much more complete if
it had included the major antifederalist speeches from the state debates.
There is yet another critical reason for including the debates from
the state ratifying conventions. Storing is concerned with analyzing
"the political thought of the Anti-Federalists."' 15 By excluding most of
the ratification debates, however, Storing has taken the "politics" out of
his study of political thought. The technical and often dry analysis of
the Constitution that Storing has presented may be the meat of a polit-
ical theorist, but much of the material lacks the passion of the political
antagonists of 1787-88.
Just as he has excluded the passion of debate, so Storing has ig-
nored the vicious. James Hutson has written that "Storing's definition
of his work justifies the exclusion of the scurrilous squibs of Antifederal-
ist mudslingers like 'A Turk,' 'Defecater,' 'Peep,' 'Peep, Jr.,' and 'A
Bricklayer.' ",16 By excluding such "mudslingers," however, Storing
may mislead students and scholars who are unaware that the debate
over the Constitution led to vitriolic, passionate, and even unfair criti-
cisms of the federalist position.
Storing's work is clearly not a "complete" compilation of antifeder-
alist writings.' 7 Nevertheless, in spite of its omissions, it will be the best
13 See 1-5 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS, supra note 6; see also 2
THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION: RATIFICA-
TION OF THE CONSTITUTION BY THE STATES, PENNSYLVANIA (M. Jensen ed. 1976). The
Rhode Island debates appear in THEODORE FOSTER'S MINUTES OF THE CONVENTION HELD
AT SOUTH KINGSTOWN, RHODE ISLAND, IN MARCH, 1790, WHICH FAILED TO ADOPT THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (R. Cotner ed. 1929). One of Storing's most impor-
tant contributions are the heretofore unpublished notes of the speeches of George Clinton in
the New York ratifying convention. See Notes of Speeches Given by George Clinton before the New
York State RatziJ ng Convention, in 6 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 9, at 177-91.
14 Storing recognized that there was no need for comprehensiveness with regard to the
convention speeches, 1 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 9, at xix, but that does
not explain the almost total omission of these speeches from this edition.
15 1 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 9, at xix.
16 Hutson, The Incomplete Antifederalist, 11 REVS. AM. HIST. 204, 204-05 (1983).
17 Hutson also indicates that Storing failed to reprint "substantial Antifederalist essays
by, among others, Algernon Sydney (beginning in the Independent Cazetteer, Nov. 21, 1787),
Cicero (id, Jan. 30, 1788) and Leonidas (Freeman'sJroumal, July 30, 1788)" as well as "John
Nicholson's important pamphlet, A View of the Proposed Constitution." Hutson, supra note 16, at
205. Hutson also chides Storing for neglecting James Warren, The Disadvantages of Federalism
upon the New Plan, Luther Martin's "important replies to the Landholder" printed in March
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source of antifederalist thought for many years to come. Having noted
what it does not have, it is time to examine what it does include.
II
DISSENT AMONG THE DISSENTERS
In his introductory essay, Storing writes that "[i]n the most obvious
sense" there was no "single Anti-Federal position."18 Storing correctly
notes that there were many points of agreement among those who op-
posed the Constitution, but, at the same time, "[i]t would be difficult to
find a single point about which all the Anti-Federalists agreed."' 9 In-
deed, they could not "even agree unanimously in opposing the adoption
of the Constitution. '20 Some were willing to accept the Constitution
with amendments, some eventually accepted it without the promise of
amendments, others wanted a second convention to rewrite the entire
document, and some would have preferred no significant changes at all
in the structure of government under the Articles of Confederation.2 1
There were clear differences on certain issues among the antifeder-
alists. Some antifederalists thought the Constitution provided too much
democracy, although most thought it was not sufficiently democratic.
On many issues there was a range of antifederalist opinion, but often
this simply represented different degrees of skepticism.
Reaction to the creation of the Senate under the new Constitution
illustrates such antifederalist differences. Because most antifederalists
believed that the states would be the greatest guardian of liberty, some
welcomed the concept of indirect election of Senators who would thus
represent the interests of the states.22 The antifederalists did not gener-
1788, and Spencer Roane's "Letter of Plain Dealer." Id To this list I would add the essays by
"Caution" [Samuel Chase] in Maryland; the essays of "Lycurgus" (in Independent Gazetteer
(Philadelphia), Oct. 17, 1787); "Letter from a Hermit" (in United States Chronicle (Provi-
dence), Mar. 27, 1788); "Philanthropos" (in Virginia Journal (Alexandria), Dec. 1787); and
"An Old Constitutionalist" (in Independent Gazetteer, Oct. 26, 1787). There are numerous
other essays and short squibs in the antifederalist newspapers that might have been published
to illustrate the variety of antifederalist sentiment.
18 1 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 9, at 5. The University of Chicago
Press has also published Storing's introductory essay, What the Anti-Federalists Were For, as a
separate paperback volume by that title.
19 Id (emphasis in original).
20 Id
21 See id
22 See, e.g., Observations Leading to a Fair Examination of the System of Covernment Proposed by the
Late Convention; And to Several Essential and Necessa7y Alterations in It. In a Number of Letters From the
Federal Farmer to the Republican (letter of Jan. 10, 1788), in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERAL-
IST, supra note 9, at 288 [hereinafter cited as Letters from the Federal Farmer] ("The senate, from
the mode of its appointment, will probably be influenced to support the state governments,
and, from its periods of service will produce stability in legislation .... "); cf. A Letterfrom a
Gentleman in a Neighbouring State, to a Gentleman in this City, in 4 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERAL-
IST, supra note 9, at 10 (although approving of states choosing Senators, fearful that Congress
may somehow punish the states if their Senators are not "acceptable to Congress").
[Vol. 70:182
BOOK REVIEW
ally agree, however, on whether the Senate under the new Constitution
was in itself a good idea.
The anonymous "Federal Farmer, '23 with his usually balanced op-
position, thought the Senate might "be useful to many purposes" in part
because the new body would "be influenced to support the state govern-
ments. " 24 Nevertheless, the "Farmer" had reservations about the six
year term of Senators, the lack of mandatory rotation in office and the
Senators' role in ratifying treaties and in impeachment. 25
Maryland's Luther Martin agreed that a Senate representing the
states was valuable, but was wary of how that body would operate
under the Constitution. Martin noted that, unlike the Articles of Con-
federation, the Constitution provided that Representatives to the na-
tional legislature be paid by the national government, not by the states.
Thus, the Senators "in conjunction with the other branch, are to pay
themselves out of the treasury of the United States; and are not liable to
be recalled during the period for which they are chosen: Thus, . . . for
siryears the senators are rendered totally and absolutely independent of their
States, of whom they ought to be the representatives .... -26
Other antifederalists were not even this sanguine about the Senate.
Pennsylvania's Samuel Bryan, writing as "Centinel," disliked the Senate
because it gave to "[t]he smallest state in the union" representation that
was of "equal weight with the great states."2 7 "Centinel" predicted that
23 The true author of the "Letters From the Federal Farmer to the Republican" is un-
known. The traditional view was that Richard Henry Lee of Virginia was the author. Stor-
ing believes this is not the case, and concludes that the author cannot be determined. 2 THE
COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 9, at 215-16. Storing's conclusion is based on the
research of Gordon Wood and the unsubstantiated assertions of W.W. Crosskey. Id. at 215;
see also 2 W.W. CROSSKEY, supra note 2, at 1299-1300 n.3. Steven R. Boyd argues that the
overwhelming contemporary opinion was that Lee was indeed the "Federal Farmer." See
Boyd, Impact of the Constitution on State Politics: New York as a Test Case, in THE HUMAN DIMEN-
SIONS OF NATION MAKING 270, 276 n. 14 (J. Martin ed. 1976). Storing curiously acknowl-
edges communications with Boyd on this question but fails to refer to Boyd's article. See
Lettersfrom the Federal Farmer, supra note 22, at 222 n. 11. Ultimately the identity of the "Fed-
eral Farmer" is not the most important question. Indeed, he may have kept his identity secret
because what mattered to many of the eighteenth century men involved in this debate, and
what should matter to us today, is the substance of the letters and not the personality behind
them. As another antifederalist wrote: "It is not material whether the federal farmer belongs
to Virginia or Kamtschatka-whether he owns five hundred negroes, or is a man of no prop-
erty at all-if his arguments are cogent-his reasonings conclusive .... " Essays by Helvidis
Priscu (essay of Jan. 22, 1788), in 4 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 9, at 158.
24 Lettersfrom the Federal Farmer (letter of Jan. 10, 1788), supra note 22, at 288.
25 Id. at 289-93.
26 Martin, The Genuine Information Delivered to the Legislature of the State of Mayland Relative
to the Proceedings of th'e General Convention Latey Held at Philadelphia, in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTs-
FEDERALIST, supra note 9, at 46 (emphasis in original).
27 Letters of Centinel, in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 9, at 142. For a
discussion of the identity of "Centinel," see 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 9,
at 130.
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the Senate would become the basis of an "aristocratic junto. '28 Because
the Senate had executive as well as legislative powers "it would become
a permanent aristocracy, and swallow up the other orders in the govern-
ment. '29 "Cincinnatus" went one step further, asserting that "the sen-
ate, is vested with-legislative-executive-and judicial powers" and
"is likely to produce a baneful aristocracy, which will swallow up the
democratic rights and liberties of the nation. '30
The Senate was just one area of the Constitution where antifederal-
ists differed. Some antifederalists, troubled by the two year terms of
members of the House, would have preferred annual elections of that
body or a guarantee of rotation in office.3 1 Others did not view the two
year term as a problem. Some antifederalists were more worried than
others about the judicial branch. 32
Sectionalism also contributed to the differences among the antifed-
eralists. Some southerners opposed the Constitution because they be-
lieved the commerce clause would harm the farming interests of the
largely agrarian South.33 Others, like Virginia's George Mason, agreed
that national regulation of commerce was necessary, but believed that
such regulation should be subject to a two-thirds vote in Congress, in
order to prevent Northern domination. 34 In contrast, the commerce
clause did not greatly concern northern antifederalists.
The question of slavery divided many antifederalists along sectional
lines. Except for Rawlins Lowndes of South Carolina,35 Storing found
28 Id. at 142.
29 Id. at 150 (emphasis in original).
30 Essays by Cincinnatus (letter of Nov. 22, 1787 to James Wilson), in 6 THE COMPLETE
ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 9, at 18. These Essays have been attributed to Richard Henry
Lee as well as his brother, Arthur Lee. The true author remains unknown. 6 THE COMPLETE
ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 9, at 5, 6 & n.2.
31 See, e.g., Letter by an Ojier of the Late Continental Army, in 3 THE COMPLETE ANTI-
FEDERALIST, supra note 9, at 94; Arms, Maynard & Field, Reasons for Dissent, in 4 THE COM-
PLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 9, at 256; Letters from the Federal Farmer (letter of Jan. 10,
1788), supra note 22, at 290-91.
32 See S. Chase, Notes of Speeches Delivered to the Mayland Ratiying Convention, in 5 THE
COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 9, at 83; A Review of the Constitution Proposed by the Late
Convention by a Federal Republican, in 3 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 9, at 77-
78; Lettersfrom the Federal Farmer (letter of Jan. 18, 1788), supra note 22, at 315-23.
33 See J.T. MAIN, supra note 2, at 273-77. Even many southerners who supported the
Constitution did not like the commerce clause. General Charles Cotesworth Pinckney of
South Carolina declared "it was the true interest of the S[outhern] States to have no regula-
tion of commerce," but agreed to the commerce clause because of "liberal views" of the east-
ern States "towards the views of South Carolina." 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787, at 449-50 (M. Farrand ed. 1911). The "views of South Carolina" was
a euphemism for the continuation of the slave trade.
34 Mason, Objections to the Constitution of Government formed by the Convention, in 2 THE COM-
PLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 9, at 12-13.
35 Speeches of Rawlins Lowndes in the South Carolina Legislature, in 5 THE COMPLETE ANTI-
FEDERALIST, supra note 9, at 150 [hereinafter cited as Lowndes]. For a more extended discus-
sion of slavery and antifederalism, see infra notes 104-23 and accompanying text.
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no opponents of the Constitution who defended the continuation of the
slave trade. On other issues involving slavery, however, northern and
southern antifederalists differed. Antifederalist interpretations of the
Constitution's war powers clauses perhaps best illustrates this sectional
split. Three Massachusetts antifederalists complained that they would
be forced to take up arms to defend slavery.36 Patrick Henry, on the
other hand, feared that the war power would be used to end slavery.
Henry warned that "[a]mong ten thousand impliedpowers' in the Con-
stitution "[the national government] may, if we be engaged in war, lib-
erate every one of your slaves if they please." 37 It is ironic that both
sides were correct in their analysis. On the one hand, troops of the na-
tional government were used to suppress slave rebellions, and to fight a
war with the Seminole Indians that, at least in part, concerned runaway
slaves.38 Both federal troops and the state militias-including those in
Massachusetts-were ordered to help return fugitive slaves to the
South.39 On the other hand, Lincoln used implied powers and the war
powers to issue the Emancipation Proclamation.4°
36 Arms, Maynard & Field, supra note 31, at 263.
37 The Debates in the Convention of the Commonwealth of Virgia, on the adoption of the Federal
Constitution, in 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS, supra note 6, at 589-90
[hereinafter cited as Virginia Debates]. Henry made this argument on June 24, 1788. Storing
provides nearly 50 pages of Henry's arguments in the Virginia ratifying convention. But
inexplicably Storing ended his excerpts of Henry's speeches on June 17, even though Henry
delivered major speeches on the 20th, the 23d, the 24th, and the 25th. See id. at 539-46, 577-
80, 587-96 & 649-52.
38 Federal troops and state militias were used to hunt down slaves after the 1831 rebel-
lion that Nat Turner led in Southampton County, Virgina. See generaly H. APTHEKER, NE-
GRO SLAVE REVOLTS (1939); F. JOHNSON, THE NAT TURNER SLAVE INSURRECFION (1966);
S. OATES, THE FIRES OF JUBILEE: NAT TURNER'S FIERCE REBELLION (1975). Federal
troops, led by Colonel Robert E. Lee, were responsible for the capture of John Brown after
Brown's raid on Harper's Ferry, Virginia. See S. OATES, To PURGE THIS LAND WITH
BLOOD, A BIOGRAPHY OF JOHN BROWN 297-303 (1970).
A major cause of the Seminole Indian Wars, fought intermittently from 1810 to 1858,
was the Seminole's willingness to offer a safe haven for fugitive slaves from Florida and Geor-
gia. A main goal of the U.S. Army during these wars was to recapture the runaway slaves.
See generally J. GIDDINGS, THE EXILES OF FLORIDA (1858); D. LITTLEFIELD, JR., AFRICANS
AND SEMINOLES (1977); J. SPRAGUE, THE ORIGIN, PROGRESS, AND CONCLUSION OF THE
FLORIDA WAR (1848); 1 H. WILSON, HISTORY OF THE RISE AND FALL OF THE SLAVE POWER
IN AMERICA 133, 515-16 (1872).
39 One of the most notorious uses of federal troops to return a fugitive slave was the
Anthony Burns episode. At a cost of thousands of dollars, several hundred federal army
troops, a detachment of U.S. Marines, a coast guard revenue cutter with full crew, and many
companies of state militia removed Anthony Bums from Boston. He was returned to Virginia
and sold at auction for $910. J. PEASE & W. PEASE, THE FUGITIVE SLAVE LAW AND
ANTHONY BURNS: A PROBLEM IN LAW ENFORCEMENT 38-53 (1975); see also S. CAMPBELL,
THE SLAVE CATCHERS 125-32 (1970).
40 J.H. FRANKLIN, THE EMANCIPATION PROCLAMATION (1963).
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III
AGREEMENT AMONG THE DISSENTERS
Despite these conflicts on certain issues, the antifederalists demon-
strated a significant degree of unity, which Storing's collection clearly
reflects. The antifederalists dissected the Constitution word by word
and clause by clause. At least one antifederalist found something objec-
tionable with virtually each part of the document. Some state politi-
cians opposed the Constitution for rather parochial reasons: a stronger
national government might undermine their power and prestige.
Others opposed it for rather narrow economic interests. Most antifeder-
alists, however, honestly feared that the new Constitution would destroy
republican government and deprive the people of their hard-won
liberties.
How the antifederalists articulated those fears illustrates the
strengths and weaknesses of the federal compact. Moreover, by examin-
ing in detail four of the antifederalist arguments-first, that the Consti-
tution was written illegally; second, that it posed a threat to American
liberty; third, that the document lacked a bill of rights; and fourth, that
the document did not resolve the slavery issue-we can more clearly
understand the meaning of the Constitution. From an examination of
these arguments, it becomes apparent that such men as George Mason,
Luther Martin, and the "Federal Farmer" understood the dangers of
the Constitution just as clearly as James Madison, Alexander Hamilton,
and James Wilson understood the virtues of the compact. While "Pub-
lius" taught Americans how great their nation might become, "Cato"
and "Brutus" warned Americans to guard their liberties and to prevent
greatness from degenerating into tyranny.
A. The Illegally Written Constitution
As might be expected from a group that included many lawyers,
the antifederalists raised serious questions about the procedures that
brought the Constitution into being. The procedural arguments against
the Constitution can be divided into three distinct issues.
The first two procedural arguments represent separate but inter-
connected attacks on the Constitutional Convention: (1) that the con-
vention went beyond its designated powers and legal authority in
writing a new constitution; and (2) that, even if the convention had a
right to propose a new form of government, the ratification provisions
which allowed nine states to create a new nation were illegal, contrary
to the Articles of Confederation, and were dangerous to the American
Union. The third procedural complaint concerned the politics of ratifi-
cation and the high handed tactics employed by those who favored the
Constitution. Antifederalists feared that the new Constitution would
[Vol. 70:182
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bring tyranny to the American nation; the ratification process certainly
did little to allay such fears.
Antifederalists argued that the Constitutional Convention was
called only to propose amendments to the existing Articles of Confeder-
ation, not to write a new constitution. "A Republican Federalist" ar-
gued that the delegates to the convention "had no other authority to act
in this matter, than what was derived from their commissions-when they
ceased to act in conformity thereto, they ceased to be a federal convention,
and had no more right to propose to the United States the new form of
government, than an equal number of other gentlemen, who might vol-
untarily have assembled for this purpose. '41
Such an argument might appear overly legalistic and even disin-
genuous. After all, the Congress could have ignored the proposed Con-
stitution and not sent it on to the states for ratification. In the broadest
sense, the Constitution was merely a recommendation for revising the
Articles, although perhaps a more extensive revision than initially con-
templated. Furthermore, even if the delegates had gone beyond their
legitimate authority, such an occurrence was not unprecedented. Only
a dozen years earlier, some members of the Second Continental Con-
gress had exceeded their authority by declaring independence. In 1787,
America was still a revolutionary nation.
In fact, this procedural argument reflected the nation's revolution-
ary heritage. The delegates to the Philadelphia convention had not
been democratically elected. The states selected these representatives
for the sole purpose of proposing amendments to the Articles. If the
people of the United States were to adopt a new Constitution, then it
seemed logical, especially to a generation of democratic revolutionaries,
that the drafting process should be broadly based.
Some of the antifederalist protest foreshadowed problems of more
modern revolutions. South Carolina's Rawlins Lowndes worried that
one illegal change would be the first step towards other illegal changes.
"Charters," he told the state legislature, "ought to be considered as sa-
cred things."'42 Lowndes noted this new constitution was "an experi-
ment" and asked why "risque the loss of political existence on
experiment?"4 3 Storing asserts that such a response was typical of
Lowndes, a conservative who feared change.44 That is in part true. But,
at the same time, Lowndes was a revolutionary, asking a question that
many modern revolutionaries would understand. Lowndes asked when
didthe revolution actually end and the process of nation-building begin?
41 Letters of A Republican Federalist (letter of Jan. 2, 1788), in 4 THE COMPLETE ANTI-
FEDERALIST, supra note 9, at 168 (emphasis in original).
42 Lowndes, supra note 35, at 149-50.
43 Id. at 150.
44 1 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 9, at 8.
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With hindsight we can readily see that the adoption of the Constitution
answered Lowndes's question. To Lowndes and his antifederalist con-
temporaries, however, the new constitution was just another governmen-
tal experiment in what appeared to be an era of permanent revolution.
The fear of the illegally written constitution led to the second pro-
cedural objection to the Constitution-that the Convention itself was
part of an antidemocratic conspiracy. Antifederalists objected not only
that the proceedings were secret and that the delegates had exceeded
their authority, but also that the convention had presented the nation
with a fail accompli that could only be voted up or down, and that the
Constitution would become effective after only nine states had accepted
it, even though the Articles of Confederation could not be amended
without the unanimous approval of the states. As the Albany Antifeder-
alist Committee proclaimed:
They have declared, that if the conventions of nine states ratify the
constitution, it shall be established between the states so ratifying the
same; by which means, if all the states should not adopt it, they have
laid a foundation to defeat the confederation and dissolve the union of
the states. A clause dictated by the same genius of aristocracy, which
prompted the convention to enjoin secresy [sic] on their members, to
keep their doors shut, their journals locked up, and none of the mem-
bers to take any extracts. 45
The fact that ratification required the approval of only nine states
undermined antifederalist efforts in both Virginia and New York. By
the time these two states voted on ratification, nine states had already
ratified the Constitution. A majority of those elected to the ratification
convention in New York opposed the Constitution. Some of these men,
including Melancton Smith, nevertheless voted for the Constitution be-
cause they believed that they had no choice. New York would have
preferred to remain in a United States governed by the Articles of Con-
federation, but, by the time New York's convention voted, that alterna-
tive no longer existed.46 The political situation that New York
confronted undermines Storing's contention that the federalists won be-
cause they had better arguments. Even the essays of "Publius"--The
Federalist Papers-could not convince New Yorkers to elect a federalist
majority to the ratifying convention.4 7 In New York, and later in North
Carolina and Rhode Island, the fact that the Constitution was already
ratified, and not superior arguments, carried the day. Had the New
York antifederalists recognized the trap created by previous ratifica-
tions, they might have raced with Maryland and Pennsylvania to be the
45 Address of the Albany Antifederal Committee, in 6 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST,
supra note 9, at 124.
46 J.T. MAIN, supra note 2, at 237-39.
47 See id. at 237.
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first to hold a convention in order to defeat the Constitution and
thereby influence subsequent state ratification debates. It is within this
context that opponents of the Constitution felt that this new form of
government was being imposed upon them.
The third procedural issue, like the first, centered on the legality of
the process. Storing asserts that the argument that the Convention
lacked legal power to write a new Constitution "became less pertinent
every day simply because the Constitution was in fact before the peo-
ple."'48 The process of ratification emerged as an even more dangerous
factor, however. In Pennsylvania, for example, the state assembly voted
to call a ratification convention before the Congress (meeting in New
York at the time) had even transmitted the Constitution to the states.49
On the penultimate day of the session, the pro-Constitution "Republi-
cans, enjoying a temporary majority in the Assembly, pressed for imme-
diate action.''50 Those opposed to the Constitution argued that a
decision on when and how to choose delegates to a ratifying convention
should be postponed until after the election of the new legislature set for
the following month. The antifederalists advocated delay on the
grounds that the Constitution was not officially before the assembly, and
that the people of the state deserved the opportunity to read the pro-
posed Constitution and vote for or against assembly members on the
basis of that document. When the temporary federalist majority re-
jected these arguments, the antifederalist members of the assembly boy-
cotted the last session in order to prevent a quorum. The next day, a
mob forced two of the assemblymen back to the chamber in order to
establish a quorum, and the call for a convention was approved.5 1
If this behavior on the part of the federalists reflected the tenor of
politics to be expected under the new Constitution, it is understandable
that many people feared an impending end to liberty. "Philadelphien-
sis" wondered
[i]f the proposed plan be a good one upon the whole, why should its
friends endeavour to prevent investigating its merits or defects? Why
should they hurry it on us before we have even read it? Does not this
look suspicious like? Is it not a proof that it is the works of darkness,
and cannot bear the light? Why should they summon a Convention
in Pennsylvania, before the tenth part of the people had time to judge
for themselves, or to know whether it was a free or a tyrannical system
of government? Why employ bullies to drag some members of the
Assembly per force to the House to make a quorum, in order to call a
Convention?52
48 1 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 9, at 7.
49 S. BOYD, supra note 2, at 23-24.
50 Id. at 23.
51 See S. BOYD, supra note 2, at 24; J.T. MAIN, supra note 2, at 187-88.
52 Essays of Philadelphiensis, in 3 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 9, at 131.
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nl n ..,rp fp-rfil! nf the - of the fed-
eralists. "An Old Whig" noted that in Boston
no man is permitted to publish a doubt of the infalibility of the late
convention, without giving up his name to the people, that he may be
delivered over to speedy destruction; and it is but a short time since
the case was little better in this city. [This was] a portion of the very
same spirit, which has so often kindled the fires of the inquisition: and
the same Zealot who would hunt a man down for a difference of opin-
ion upon a political question which is the subject of public enquiry, if
he should happen to be fired with zeal for a particular species of reli-
gion, would be equally intolerant. 53
Since the proposed Constitution contained no Bill of Rights or protec-
tions of speech or "Liberty of Conscience," 54 it is not unreasonable that
the "Old Whig" was concerned about the implications of force and the
ratification process. He warned: "They are idiots who trust their future
security to the whim of the present hour."55
The "Federal Farmer" was calmer but his position was similar.
The "Farmer" rejected the need for the new Constitution, noting that if
"we remain cool and temperate, we are in no immediate danger of any
commotions; we are in a state of perfect peace, and in no danger of
invasions; the state governments are in the full exercise of their pow-
ers." 5 6 The "Farmer" acknowledged there were problems with the "reg-
ulation of trade, securing credit" and paying public debts, but he
asserted "whether we adopt a change, three or nine months hence" did
not matter.57 The nation was only just recovering from "a long and
distressing war."'58 The "Farmer" thought the nation should finish its
post-war recovery and "reform our federal system" but not by hastily
changing the whole system for one which might "totally destroy the lib-
erties of this country." 59
B. A Threat to Liberty
How might the Constitution "totally destroy the liberties" of
America? Some antifederalists feared the presidency, a position that
combined the responsibilities of the nation's civil executive with those of
commander-in-chief of the Army, while allowing for unlimited terms in
"Philadelphiensis" was a mathematics instructor at the University of Pennsylvania. 3 THE
COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 9, at 99.
53 Essays of An Old Whig, in 3 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 9, at 35
(footnote omitted).
54 Id. at 34.
55 Id. at 35.
56 Lettersjrom the Federal Farmer (letter of Oct. 8, 1787), supra note 22, at 225.
57 Id
58 Id
59 Id. at 226.
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office. Patrick Henry looked at the Constitution and did not see the
"beautiful features" 60 that James Madison saw. Henry told the Virginia
ratifying convention, "when I come to examine these features, Sir, they
appear to me horridly frightful: Among other deformities, it has an aw-
ful squinting; it squints towards monarchy .. . Your President may
easily become King .... "61 Others worried about the Senate whose
members would serve long terms without any check on them by the
people. Many antifederalists predicted that the Senate would become
an aristocracy. Because the Senate possessed executive and judicial, as
well as legislative, roles, that body seemed especially dangerous. Henry
warned, "Your Senate is so imperfectly constructed that your dearest
rights may be sacrificed by what may be a small minority; and a very
small minority may continue forever unchangeably this Government,
although horridly defective."'62
Even the House of Representatives was too remote for some anti-
federalists. In their view, that body consisted of too few members for it
to be truly representative of the people.6 3
At first glance such fears seem virtually unfounded, but there is an
eerie modernity to these antifederalist concerns. Is the modern imperial
presidency any different from the one the antifederalists feared? Even
the War Powers Act 64 has not prevented an American president from
sending troops to Lebanon and Grenada. Without such a law, a secret
war in Cambodia and Laos was fought for many years. And the impe-
rial presidency has not been confined to foreign affairs. With a single
order, Franklin Roosevelt incarcerated nearly 100,000 American citizens
for three and a half years.65 As the antifederalists might have predicted,
even the Supreme Court lacked both the moral authority and the moral
sensitivity to object.66 The use of federal troops to suppress strikes in the
nineteenth century and veterans protesting the depression during the
60 Speeches of Patrick Heng in the Virginia State Ratifing Convention (speech ofJune 5, 1788),
in 5 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 9, at 224 [hereinafter cited as Speeches of
Patrick Heng].
61 Id.
62 Id
63 See, e.g., Chase, supra note 32, at 89; Mason, supra note 34, at 11; Essays ofJohn De Witt,
in 4 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 9, at 27-28; Letters fom the Federal Farmer,
supra note 22, at 287; The Address and Reasons of Dissent of the Minority of the Convention of Penn-
sylvania to their Constituents, in 3 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 9, at 158-59.
64 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-48 (1982).
65 See Exec. Order No. 9066 (1942), reprinted in 3 C.F.R. 1092 (1938-1942 comp. 1968);
see alsoJ. BURNS, ROOSEVELT: THE SOLDIER OF FREEDOM 213-17, 266-68, 463-64 (1979); R.
DANIELS, THE DECISION TO RELOCATE THE JAPANESE AMERICANS (1975); P. IRONS, JUS-
TICE AT WAR (1983).
66 The Court refused to interfere with a curfew imposed on American citizens of Japa-
nese ancestry, Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943), or with their internment,
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). See generally J. TENBROEK, PREJUDICE,
WAR AND THE CONSTITUTION (1954). The Court modified its support of the internment in
Exparte Endo, 323 U.S. 283 (1944).
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1932 Bonus March are yet other examples of what the antifederalists
feared. If there are few such instances of this type of behavior in our
nation's early history, it may be because the fears of the antifederalists
remained alive until the Civil War. If there are more instances in recent
years, it may be because a less well-read and less historically aware
America has forgotten the warnings of antifederalists.
The fear of secrecy in government has only recently been redis-
covered by Americans. The antifederalists had a healthy dose of this
fear. The Constitution itself had been written in secret, and then simply
presented to the states for approval or disapproval. This in itself was an
argument against the Constitution, but it also underscored the antifed-
eralist demand for open government. 67 Edmund Randolph worried
about executives acting in secret. 68 "Deliberator" warned Pennsylvani-
ans that "Congress may withhold, as long as they shall think proper, all
information respecting their proceedings from the people."69 William
Symmes sarcastically noted that the Constitution required " '[t]he
Houses to keep a journal, and to publish the same, excepting such parts
as may in theirjudgment require secresy.' Good again. A very wise Con-
gress!" 70 Symmes pointed out that such secrecy used to apply to "pri-
vate articles in foreign treaties, secret expeditions, &c.," 71 but now
anything might be kept secret. Symmes asked, "Who can complain, af-
ter this, that he knows nothing of public affairs, except the expenditure
of the public money?" 72 Patrick Henry, vitriolic and untrusting as ever,
pointed out that the phrase "from time to time" in the section of the Con-
stitution requiring a congressional journal "admits of any extension. '73
He predicted Congress may "carry on the most wicked and pernicious of
schemes, under the dark veil of secrecy. The liberties of a people never
were nor ever will be secure, when the transactions of their rulers may
be concealed from them."74 These antifederalists would surely have rec-
ognized the steps that led to Watergate and the arguments of govern-
ment lawyers in the Pentagon Papers case.75 The futile attempts to
force Congress to reveal how much is spent on "national security," the
67 Martin, supra note 26, at 26-27; A Review of the Constitution Proposed by the Late Convention
by a Federal Republican, supra note 32, at 70; Letters of Cato, in 3 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERAL-
isT, supra note 9, at 107; Letters of Centinel, supra note 27, at 144.
68 Letterfrom Edmund Randolph Giving His Reasons for Refusing His Signature To the Proposed
Federal Constitution, in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 9, at 92.
69 Essay by Deliberator, in 3 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 9, at 179.
70 Symmes, Letter to Capt. Peter Osgood, Jr. (Nov. 15, 1787), in 4 THE COMPLETE ANTI-
FEDERALIST, supra note 9, at 57 (emphasis in original).
71 Id.
72 Id. See also A Friend to the Rights of the People, Anti-Federalist, No. I, in 4 THE COM-
PLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 9, at 238-39.
73 Speeches of Patrick Heny (speech of June 5, 1788), supra note 60, at 237 (emphasis in
original).
74 Id
75 See New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
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refusal of the government to allow reporters on Grenada during the
1983 invasion,76 and the attempts to silence critics of the Central Intelli-
gence Agency77 would not have surprised the antifederalists.
Antifederalist criticisms of the Congress also have a strikingly mod-
ern tone. The Senate often has been called a "millionaires' club," dis-
tant from the people, and, if not aristocratic, at least the servant of
certain special (and usually elite) interests. 7 s The seventeenth amend-
ment, which provides for direct popular election of Senators, suggests
that the antifederalists were right in fearing an aristocratic Senate.
Many antifederalists also feared a system of government that did
not provide for rotation of office.79 They argued that if men remained
in office for too long a period, they would be corrupted by power. The
twenty-second amendment, which limits the permissible number of
presidential terms, represents a delayed response to the antifederalist
fear of a Constitution that lacked mandatory rotation in office. The
seniority system of Congress and the difficulty of unseating incumbents
make the antifederalists seem like prophets. Samuel Chase of Maryland
complained that members of the House of Representatives "will not be
the representatives of the people at large but really of a few rich men in
each state. A representative should be the image of those he represents.
He should know their sentiments and their wants and desires .... o80
Chase feared that "only the gentg, the rich and well born will be
elected." 8' It might be impractical to enlarge the House, but no one can
seriously argue that congressmen from geographically large and diverse
76 See N.Y. Times, Nov. 8, 1983, at A10, col. 2.
77 See Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980).
78 The first use of the term "millionaires' club" in American politics was in 1888. Popu-
lists and progressives used the term "millionaires' club" at various times in the 1890s. In
1907, one editorialist wrote "[Tihe 'millionaires' club' is a facetious but truthful alias for our
Upper House." Shall Millionaires Run the Government?, 35 AM. MONTHLY REVIEW OF REVIEWS
340, 340 (1907). See also H. SPERBER & T. TRITTSCHuH, AMERICAN POLITICAL TERMS 267
(1962). The term might remain apt today. In 1983, 23 Senators reported wealth of at least
one million dollars. At that time, Senators had a salary of over $60,000, which was more than
five times the national average salary of $11,056. N.Y. Times, May 22, 1983, § 1, at 21, col. 1.
See also Detailed Listing of Senators' 1982 Finances, CONG. Q., Dec. 3, 1983, at 2563-94.
79 See, e.g., Warren, Histoiy of the Rise, Progress and Termination of the American Revolution
(Chapter 31), in 6 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 9, at 199; Observations on the
New Constitution, And on the Federal and State Conventions B a Columbian Patriot, in 4 THE COM-
PLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 9, at 275-76, 278; Speech by Charles Turner (Jan. 17, 1788),
in 4 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 9, at 218.
80 Chase, supra note 32, at 89. Samuel Chase later became a "high" federalist and served
on the United States Supreme Court from 1796 to 1811. His notorious and repressive activi-
ties on the bench in trials concerning violations of the Sedition Act of 1798 illustrated the
inadequacies of the Constitution for protecting political dissidents. Chase's later actions also
underscore the importance of the Bill of Rights. We can only speculate how Chase and other
Federalist judges would have acted without the restraint of the Bill of Rights. For a history of
the Sedition Act, see generally J. SMITH, FREEDOM'S FETTERS (1956); see also Koffler &
Gershman, The New Seditious Libel, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 816, 827-30 (1984).
81 Chase, supra note 32, at 89 (emphasis in original).
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districts can possibly represent the interests and needs of all their constit-
uents. Certainly the percentage of "rich men" and women in the House
far exceeds the national average.8
2
The antifederalists did not limit their attacks to specific provisions
of the Constitution. Rather, they looked at the whole document, and
they shuddered. "John Humble" envisioned a standing army collecting
taxes. Those poor persons unable to pay would be hauled off "before
our federal judges, who shall have power without jug or trial, to order the
said miscreants for immediate execution; nor will we think their sen-
tence severe unless after being hanged they are also to be both beheaded
and quartered."8 3 "A Turk" sarcastically praised the new Constitution
for
the resemblance that it bears to that of our much admired Sublime
Porte. Your President general will greatly resemble in his powers the
mighty Ahdul Ahmed, our august Sultan-the senate will be his di-
van-your standing army will come in the place of our janizaries-
your judges unchecked by vile juries may with great propriety be
styled cadis .... 84
More sober critics of the Constitution were equally alarmed by the
new powers of the new government. "Brutus" warned New Yorkers that
"standing armies in time of peace are dangerous to liberty, and have
often been the means of overturning the best constitutions of govern-
ment."' 85 "Brutus" warned Americans that they would not always be
fortunate enough to have men like Washington to lead their armies.
"Brutus" pointed out that after the victory in the Revolutionary War
some officers wanted to march on the government but "[f]ortunately
82 Assets of members of the House of Representatives in the 97th Congress are listed in
FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE REPORTS OF MEMBERS OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
OF THE 97TH CONGRESS, H.R. Doc. No. 97-197, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982). Similar reports
have been published in recent years. These documents, however, do not give the total assets
for each member and there are no summaries. Furthermore, assets are reported by ranges,
rather than by specific amount. Although it is impossible to know exactly how rich members
of the House are, it is clear from even the limited information available that the members are
quite wealthy compared to the average citizen. Their salary in 1983 of more than $60,000 far
exceeded the average American worker's salary of $11,056. See N.Y. Times, supra note 78; see
also Disclosure of Representatives' 1982 Finances, CONG. Q., Dec. 10, 1983, at 2631-65.
83 Address ofJohn Humble, in 3 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 9, at 90
(emphasis in original).
84 Letter from A Turk (in Independent Gazetteer, Oct. 10, 1787), reprinted in PENN-
SYLVANIA AND THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 159, 159 (J. McMaster & F. Stone eds. 1888). It
is unfortunate that Storing failed to print any of the many vicious little antifederalist articles
that reflected the fears of a good number of Americans.
85 Essays of Brutus (essay of Jan. 24, 1788), in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra
note 9, at 416. Storing questions the traditional attribution of these essays to Robert Yates. 2
THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 9, at 358. For a legal history of the back-
ground to the controversy concerning standing armies in the colonies before the American
Revolution, see J. REID, IN DEFIANCE OF THE LAW: THE STANDING ARMY CONTROVERSY,
THE Two CONSTITUTIONS, AND THE COMING OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1981).
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indeed for this country, it had at the head of the army, a patriot as well
as a general."' s6 These antifederalist protests, among other factors,
helped set the American pattern of strong civilian control of the army
through both the executive and the legislative branches. During the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, standing armies were miniscule in
part because the antifederalists' fears of a standing army were absorbed
into American political ideology. Given the militaristic sentiments of
some of the Federalist founders, most notably Alexander Hamilton, the
antifederalist arguments against a standing army become even more
significant.
"Centinel" feared not only a standing army but the abuse of local
militias by the national government. 87 He also understood, far better
than the Federalists, that the Constitution would allow a tyranny of the
majority to persecute Quakers and other conscientious objectors. "Cen-
tinel" believed the Constitution would "subject" American citizens
to the most arbitrary military discipline, [and] even death may be
inflicted on the disobedient; in the character of militia, you may be
dragged from your families and homes to any part of the continent,
and for any length of time. . . and as militia, you may be made the
unwilling instruments of oppression, under the direction of govern-
ment; there is no exemption upon account of conscientious scruples of
bearing arms .... 88
Maryland's Luther Martin feared that congressional authority over
the militia meant that "the only defence and protection which the State can
have for the security of their rights against arbitraq encroachments of the
general government, is taken entirely out of the power of their respective States,
and placed under the power of Congress ... *"89 Martin believed that
the state militias were necessary "to counteract the arbitrary measures of
the general government" and he thought "every State in the union
ought to reject [the Constitution] with indignation, since, if the general
government should attempt to oppress and enslave [the states], they
could not have any possible means of self defence." 90 The second
amendment 9' was ultimately added to the Constitution because antifed-
eralists such as Martin helped convince the nation that "the security of a
free State" would only be maintained if local militias could not be de-
stroyed by some future tyrannical central government. 92
86 Essays of Braus, supra note 85, at 414.
87 Letters of Centinet (letter of Nov. 5, 1787), supra note 27, at 159-60.
88 Id. at 159.
89 Martin, supra note 26, at 58 (emphasis in original).
90 Id at 59.
91 "A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of
the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed." U.S. CONST. amend. II.
92 Patrick Henry expressed a similar fear in the Virginia ratifying convention.
Throughout that convention, Henry consistently demanded a Bill of Rights to protect "the
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"Centinel" would not have been so concerned about a standing
army or the destruction of the state militias if the Constitution guaran-
teed a free press: "For even a standing army, that grand engine of op-
pression, if it were as numerous as the abilities of any nation could
maintain, would not be equal to the purposes of despotism over an en-
lightened people."'93 Indeed, "[a]s long as the liberty of the press contin-
ues unviolated, and the people have the right of expressing and
publishing their sentiments upon every public measure, it is next to im-
possible to enslave a free nation. ' 94 "Centinel" noted with great regret
that "[t]he abolition of that grand palladium of freedom, the liberty of
the press, in the proposed plan of government, and the conduct of its
authors, and patrons, is a striking exemplification of these
observations. 95
C. Towards the Bill of Rights
The most common complaint of the antifederalists was that the
Constitution lacked a Bill of Rights. Most of the fears of "Centinel,"
"Brutus," "John Humble," and "A Turk" might have been allayed if
the Constitution had contained such protections. Indeed, the least un-
derstandable aspect of the ratification struggle was not the demand for a
Bill of Rights, but the insistence of the federalists, particularly Hamil-
ton, that it was unnecessary.
96
people" and the states from the national government. Henry particularly feared a national
military tyranny that, in his view, only the state militias would be able to thwart. But Henry
warned that, "[a] standing army we shall have also, to execute the execrable commands of
tyranny." To resist that tyranny would be impossible, Henry believed, in part because "[the
state] militia is given up to Congress also in another part of the plan. . . . All power will be
in their own possession. . . . Of what service would militia be to you, when most probably
you will not have a single musket in the State; for as arms are to be provided by Congress,
they may or may not furnish them." Speeches of Patrick Heng, supra note 60, at 217.
93 Letters of Centinel (undated essay), supra note 27, at 144.
94 Id at 143-44.
95 Id at 144.
96 "It is significant that Alexander Hamilton did not share either the anxiety or dissatis-
faction of his contemporaries over the absence of a bill of rights in the original Constitution."
S. KONEFSKY, JOHN MARSHALL AND ALEXANDER HAMILTON, ARCHITECTS OF THE AMERI-
CAN CONSTITUTION 20 (1964). Hamilton believed that under the new Constitution a Bill of
Rights was unnecessary because the powers of the new government were strictly limited.
Thus, Hamilton wrote, "I go further, and affirm that bills of rights, in the sense and in the
extent in which they are contended for, are not only unnecessary in the proposed constitution,
but would even be dangerous. . . . For why declare that things shall not be done which
there is no power to do?" THE FEDERALIST, No. 84, at 579 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
Hamilton seems also to have been annoyed with the demands for a Bill of Rights simply
because such demands threatened ratification. Thus, Hamilton complained of "the pre-
tended defects" of the Constitution, which included "the omission of a formal bill of rights,
the omission of a provision respecting the liberty of the press." THE FEDERALIST No. 85,
supra, at 588. Given the vague powers granted to Congress through the various war powers
clauses and the "necessary and proper clause" (U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8) and to the President
as commander-in-chief, it is easy to understand why the antifederalists feared the lack of a
Bill of Rights. The arrogant intolerance that Hamilton showed for dissenters throughout his
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In his introductory essay, Storing asserts that the Bill of Rights was
"an ambiguous legacy" of the antifederalists because "the success of the
Bill of Rights reflects the failure of the Anti-Federalists. '97 Had the
Constitution not been ratified, a Bill of Rights would have been unnec-
essary. Thus, Storing concludes that "[t]he whole emphasis on reserva-
tions of rights of individuals implied a fundamental acceptance of the
'consolidated' character of the new government."98 This analysis is
flawed because it assumes that the antifederalists were tied to a strict
theory of government. They certainly did not believe that a consoli-
dated national government would succeed. They assumed it would de-
generate into tyranny. Their major fear was of tyranny itself, and not of
a particular kind of government. They wanted strict separation of pow-
ers, limitations on the military, rotation in office, and other changes be-
cause these reforms would prevent tyranny. Most of all, however, the
antifederalists wanted a Bill of Rights.
The importance of a Bill of Rights to the antifederalists is suggested
by the objections to the Constitution of those who participated in the
Convention in Philadelphia. George Mason, who attended the Conven-
tion in its entirety, refused to sign the final document. Mason began his
Objections to the Constitution of Government fonned by the Convention by stating:
"There is no Declaration of Rights; and the Laws of the general Govern-
ment being paramount to the Laws and Constitutions of the several
States, the Declaration of Rights in the separate States are no Secur-
ity."99 Mason's other major objections to the Constitution flowed from
this deficiency. Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts also refused to sign the
Constitution, explaining his decision this way: "It was painful to me, on
a subject of such national importance, to differ from the respectable
members who signed the constitution: But conceiving as I did, that the
liberties of America were not' secured by the system, it was my duty to
oppose it."100 Gerry had grave reservations about the relationship be-
tween the executive and legislative branches, but his foremost objection
was "that the system is without the security of a bill of rights."'' 1
The willingness of the antifederalists to accept a Bill of Rights sug-
gests that they were, in the end, not "men of little faith."'01 2 Quite the
career, as well as his creative use of the "necessary and proper clause" to promote the first
bank of the United States, suggests that the antifederalists were justified in demanding a Bill
of Rights. See, e.g., P. BREST & S. LEVINSON, THE PROCESS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISION-
MAKING: CASES AND MATERIALS 15-18 (2d ed. 1983) (presenting Hamilton's arguments
utilizing the "necessary and proper" clause in support of Bank of the United States).
97 1 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 9, at 65.
98 Id.
99 Mason, supra note 34, at 11.
100 Ho; Mr. Geny's objections to signing the National Constitution, in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-
FEDERALIST, supra note 9, at 6.
101 Id. at 7.
102 See Kenyon, supra note 2.
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opposite, they were men of great faith. They were willing to risk this
experiment in government provided that the Constitution protected a
free press, jury trials, and due process; incorporated bans on arbitrary
and cruel justice; and allowed for state militias that would be able to
strike back against any president or general who might attempt to seize
power.
In another sense they were also the great realists of the period.
Most scholars point to the Federalist Papers to illustrate that Madison and
Hamilton understood the dangers of the majority. The great beauty of
the American system, we are told, is that the rights of the minority were
protected through the diffusion of power and limited government. But,
it was the antifederalists who saw that without a Bill of Rights there
would be no limits on the government. They understood just how cor-
rupting power could be. Had it been left to Hamilton and James Wil-
son, the republic might not have survived to celebrate its two hundredth
birthday. Some Imperial President might long ago have created his
own empire, acting as commander-in-chief and aided by a pliant Con-
gress utilizing the necessary and proper clause. It was the faith of the
antifederalists like "Centinel" who understood that "if the liberty of the
press . . . could be rendered sacred, . . . despotism would fly before
it. ,,103
D. Antifederalism and Antislavery
Seventy-four years after the ratification debates began, America's
great constitutional experiment almost ended. The Civil War nearly de-
stroyed what the framers had built. The nation not only survived, but
altered the Constitution in ways that removed many of its perceived
defects. The Civil War, caused by slavery, led to the end of that institu-
tion. Furthermore, as a consequence of the Civil War, the Bill of Rights
would be extended to the states. 104
The Civil War might not have surprised those antifederalists trou-
bled by the new government's connection to slavery. Whether they op-
posed the Constitution because it aided slavery, or, in the case of a few
southerners, because it did not protect slavery enough, those antifederal-
ists who attacked the Constitution because of its relationship with slav-
ery displayed an understanding that the federalists could not, or would
not, appreciate. Quite simply, many of the antifederalists understood,
as Lincoln would verbalize seventy years later, "A house divided against
itself cannot stand. I believe this government cannot endure, perma-
103 Letters of Centinel, supra note 27, at 143 (emphasis in original).
104 On the legal history of the war and its aftermath, see H. HYMAN & W. WIECEK,
EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER LAW: CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT, 1835-1875 (1982).
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nently half slave and halffree."'0 5
The question of slavery was present throughout the debates over
the Constitution. At the Convention, Madison cogently argued that the
states were not divided by size, but "[from the effects of] their having or
not having slaves." 10 6 The Constitution contained a number of explicit
clauses protecting slavery. In addition, a number of clauses indirectly
protected the institution. 10 7
During the debates over ratification, the antifederalists were usu-
ally far more willing than the federalists to discuss the connection be-
tween slavery and the Constitution. This should not be surprising.
Many antifederalists, in the South as well as the North, were quick to
attack the provisions allowing the African slave trade. 0 8 Only in South
Carolina and Georgia was it respectable to defend this clause.' 0 9 Some
southern antifederalists did attack the Constitution as a threat to slavery
but, by and large, federalists successfully parried these criticisms. Few
could argue with Edmund Randolph, who told the Virginia ratifying
convention "[w]ere it right here to mention what passed in convention
I might tell you that the Southern States, even South Carolina herself, con-
ceived this property to be secure .... I believe, whatever we may think
here, that there was not a member of the Virginia delegation who had
the smallest suspicion of the abolition of slaver." I 10
105 2 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 461 (R. Basler ed. 1953) (empha-
sis in original).
106 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 33, at 486; see
also P. FINKELMAN, AN IMPERFECT UNION 20-45 (1981).
107 The Constitution protected slavery directly through the three-fifths clause (U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 2), the slave trade clause (art. I, § 9), the fugitive slave clause (art. IV, § 2),
and the amendment provisions of article V. Indirect protection for slavery is found in the
guarantee to suppress slave rebellions. See W. WIECEK, THE SOURCES OF ANTISLAVERY
CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA, 1760-1848, at 62-83 (1977).
108 Among the southerners who opposed the slave trade was the Kentuckian "Repub-
licus," who thought that the slave trade provision to be "an excellent clause. . . in an Alge-
rian Constitution." Essays by Republicus (essay of Mar. 1, 1788), in 5 THE COMPLETE ANTI-
FEDERALIST, supra note 9, at 169. See also Martin, supra note 26, at 59; Sentiments of Many, in 5
THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 9, at 276. Federalists north of Georgia and
South Carolina attempted to minimize the impact of this clause and discussed it as little as
possible. Where they did discuss it, the northern federalists were often quite misleading as to
what the clause would accomplish. James Wilson, who surely knew better, tried to convince
the Pennsylvania ratifying convention that the clause would allow Congress to end all slavery
in the United States. Wilson argued that after "the lapse of a few years, . . . Congress will
have power to exterminate Slavery within our borders." 2 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL
STATE CONVENTIONS, supra note 6, at 484.
109 See P. FINKELMAN, supra note 106, at 23-24; D. ROBINSON, SLAVERY IN THE STRUC-
TURE OF AMERICAN POLITICS, 1765-1820, at 222-45 (1972); Lowndes, supra note 35, at 159-52
(speech of Jan. 16, 1788).
110 Virginia Debates, supra note 37, at 599 (emphasis in original). Randolph attended the
Constitutional Convention but refused to sign the document. Id. at 24-25. That would seem
to make him an antifederalist. He later supported and voted for the Constitution in the
Virginia ratifying convention. Id. at 652, 655. When Randolph made the statement quoted,
he still opposed the Constitution.
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That antifederalists discussed slavery is subject to two different in-
terpretations. Some scholars have assumed that the antifederalists em-
ployed any argument that might defeat the Constitution. This analysis
leads to the conclusion that any antifederalist who raised the issue of
slavery was simply trying to sabotage the whole Constitution by discuss-
ing the undiscussable. Thus, Cecelia M. Kenyon dismissed "Cato's" op-
position to the Constitution because he criticized "the guarantee of a
continuation of the slave trade until 1808, without considering whether
such compromises were necessary to secure agreement among the vari-
ous groups whose interests and ideas were in conflict."1 1 ' Kenyon's ar-
gument implies that the success of the Constitution was worth any cost
and any compromise. We can only speculate if any of the more than
80,000 slaves imported into the United States before 1808 would have
agreed with Kenyon. Storing curiously relegates the entire issue of slav-
ery to a footnote on the last page of his essay What The Anti-Federalists
Were For. Here Storing states that "[t]he Anti-Federalists were less easily
persuaded that questions of politics can be freed from questions of
conscience."' 12
The second interpretation of antifederalist opposition to slavery is
that many Americans sincerely opposed constitutional protection for
slavery on both moral and policy grounds. For example, "A Country-
man from Dutchess County" thought that Americans might become "a
happy and respectable people" if the Constitution were "corrected by a
substantial bill of rights" and, among other changes, the states were
forced into "relinquishing every idea of drenching the bowels of Africa
in gore, for the sake of enslaving its free-born innocent inhabitants."' 13
This is rather strong language, but it pales before Joshua Atherton's
ringing complaint in the New Hampshire convention:
The idea that strikes those, who are opposed to this clause, so disa-
greeably and so forcibly, is, hereby it is conceived (if we ratify the
Constitution) that we become consenters to, and partakers in, the sin and
guilt of this abominable traffic ....
We do not think ourselves under any obligation to perform works
of supererogation in the reformation of mankind; we do not esteem
ourselves under any necessity to go to Spain or Italy to suppress the
inquisition of those countries; or of making a journey to the Carolinas
to abolish the detestable custom of enslaving the Africans; but, sir, we
111 THE ANTIEDERALISTS, supra note 4, at 301.
112 1 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 9, at 100 n.20. Storing's refusal to
address the question of the relationship between the founders and the issue of slavery is just
one example of his pro-federalist sympathies. The texts of Storing's volumes seriously under-
mine his assertion that the "Federalists were not, generally speaking, less antislavery than the
Anti-Federalists." Id.
113 Lettersfiom a Countrymanfiom Dutchess County (letter of Jan. 22, 1788), in 6 THE COM-
PLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 9, at 62 (emphasis in original).
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will not lend the aid of our ratification to this cruel and inhuman
merchandise, not even for a day. There is a great distinction in not
taking a part in the most barbarous violation of the sacred laws of
God and humanity, and our becoming guaranties for its exercise for a
term of years. 114
The passions of Atherton and others on this issue shaped how the
Constitution would be understood and implemented. "A Friend of the
Rights of People" asked, "Can we then hold up our hands for a Consti-
tution that licences this bloody practice? Can we who have fought so
hard for Liberty give our consent to have it taken away from others?
May the powers above forbid."" 5 "A Friend" was particularly troubled
because even after twenty years the Constitution did not require that
"this cruel and barbarous practice. . . shall cease." 1 6 It is likely, how-
ever, that the strong antifederalist criticism of the slave trade insured
that the clause which permitted its continuation would be construed
narrowly, and as soon as the twenty year time limit ended, the trade
would be prohibited. To defend the Constitution, federalists were
forced to insist that the slave trade would end in 1808.
Nevertheless, federalist support for the slave trade deeply troubled
many Americans. Three Massachusetts antifederalists wondered what
type of men the federalists were who "now appear such strenuous advo-
cates for the establishment of that diabolical trade of importing the Afri-
cans."''1 These antifederalists were concerned about "forming a
constitution for the whole" nation which supposed "the states are under
obligation. . . reciprocally to aid each other in defence and support of
every thing to which they are entitled thereby, right or wrong."" 8 They
wondered when they would be called to suppress a slave revolt. More
importantly, these antifederalists recognized that a compromise with
slavery could not last forever. They believed the Constitution with "this
lust for slavery, [was] portentous of much evil in America, for the cry of
innocent blood, . . . hath undoubtedly reached to the Heavens, to
which that cry is always directed, and will draw down upon them ven-
geance adequate to the enormity of the crime."119 Their fears might
seem fantastic and apocalyptic; but the slaughter at Shiloh, Antietam,
and a thousand other battle sites proved that they were far more pre-
scient about the nature of the Constitution than were those sanguine
114 Fragment of Debate at New Hampishire Convention, in 2 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL
STATE CONVENTIONS, supra note 6, at 203-04 (emphasis in original). Storing unfortunately
did not include this speech in THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, even though it is one of the
few in existence from the New Hampshire ratifying convention.
115 A Friend to the Rights of the People, supra note 72, at 234, 241.
116 Id
117 Arms, Maynard & Field, supra note 3 1, at 262-63.
118 Id. at 263.
"9 Id.
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federalists who believed that anything might be compromised for the sake
of union and prosperity. 120
Northern antifederalists were not the only ones to complain about
the extension of the African slave trade. Virginia's "Republicus"
thought that the slave trade provision was "[a]n excellent clause this, in
an Algerian constitution: but not so well calculated (I hope) for the
latitude of America."1 21 Maryland's Luther Martin tied opposition to
the slave trade with opposition to the three-fifths clause. He thought the
latter an "absurdity" for "increasing the power of a State in making laws
for free men in proportion as that State violated the rights offreedom.' 12 2 Fur-
thermore, he objected to counting slaves for purposes of representation
because that "tended to encourage the slave trade, and to make it the interest
of the States to continue that infamous trafi."'23
IV
BEYOND RATIFICATION
When the new Constitution became effective on June 21, 1788, Vir-
ginia and New York had not yet ratified the document. The new na-
tion, however, could hardly expect to survive without these two key
states.
The battle for ratification in Virginia was won when a motion by
Patrick Henry for amendments to the Constitution before its ratification
was defeated by eight votes. A change of but five votes would have kept
Virginia out of the Union. 124 Before the Virginia convention could take
its final vote and adjourn, George Mason brought his antifederalist al-
lies together for one last strategy session. To Mason's surprise, antifeder-
alist Benjamin Harrison urged his colleagues to accept defeat and work
under the Constitution in hopes that "'those destructive consequences
to their liberty . . .which the minority apprehended'" might never
materialize. 125
It is fortunate for the nation that most antifederalists followed Har-
rison's advice. The greatness of the antifederalists ultimately was their
willingness to work within the structure to oppose tyranny, rather than
to take up arms against a government they feared.' 2 6 The antifederal-
120 See supra text accompanying note 111-12.
121 Essays by Republits, supra note 108, at 169.
122 Martin, supra note 26, at 49 (emphasis in original).
123 Id
124 Virginia ratification is discussed in R. RUTLAND, supra note 2, at 249-53. Henry's
procedural motion was defeated by a vote of 88 to 80. Id. at 250. The final vote for ratifica-
tion was 89 to 79. Two of those who voted for the Constitution in the Virginia convention
were from Washington County, which was actually in Pennsylvania. J.T. MAIN, supra note 2,
at 229 n.31.
125 Quoted in R. RUTLAND, supra note 2, at 251.
126 A similar position is taken and more fully developed in S. BOYD, supra note 2.
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ists sought, as one of Mason's Virginia allies stated, "[t]o form a govern-
ment that shall shield you from dangers from abroad, promote your
general and local interests, protect in safety the life, liberty, and prop-
erty, of the peaceful, the virtuous and the weak, against the encroach-
ments of the disorderly and licentious."' 27 When the Bill of Rights they
demanded was added to the Constitution, much of their goal was ac-
complished. By taking part in the new government the antifederalists
helped ensure the success of the Constitution they opposed. It is at least
partially because of their willingness to remain politically active that
their articulated fears of 1787-88 seem so extreme. The Virginian just
quoted in fact had a significant influence in this regard. As a Senator,
Governor, diplomat, Secretary of State, and finally President, James
Monroe was instrumental in implementing a Constitution that he ini-
tially opposed.
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